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Outside of China, Cuba, and a few western universities, it is generally accepted that market criteria -
prices related to cost, and investments to profitability - are more efficient than administrative directives to 
allocate scarce resources among competing needs. The superiority of the market is not due to the superiority of 
the people concerned-it is not suggested that workers in the public sector are less honest or industrious than those 
in the private sector. The success of the market is probably due to superior information (received, for example, 
from price changes), and to its inability to support enterprises that, cannot cover their costs out of revenues. 
Despite the proven superiority of market criteria in commercial and industrial activities, many public 
services still depend on administrative decisions for allocating and pricing their resources, and for investment 
choices. The point can be illustrated by the case of roads which, in all countries, are provided in accordance with 
the very planning processes that have been discredited in Eastern Europe and other static economies. 
Readers of this paper, many of whom might be professionally concerned with the design of road systems, 
may find it objectionable to be compared to functionaries of discredited "command economies". They should 
not take offence. This criticism - made by an author who is himself involved in such exercises - is not directed at 
road planners, but at the criteria and methods governing their operations. These methods and the criteria - such 
as "benefiUcost analysis" - might be the best that we know, but they are not the methods used by free markets, 
because there is no ''market" in road space. Road users are free to purchase vehicles, but they are not given the 
opportunity to buy or lease road space, however great the economic demand. They make their needs for roads 
known through political processes, and the investments are politically determined in the light of the best technical 
advice available. 
Maybe it is no coincidence that, of all the activities undertaken by government, few are worse managed 
than roads. Traffic congestion in cities, the most glaring and ubiquitous example of waste, is so taken for granted 
that it is regarded by many as a "disease of civilization." However, under-used roads outside cities also involve 
substantial waste, as does the tendency to prefer new projects over the maintenance of existing ones. 
The purpose of this paper it to sketch the elements of a road system consistent with market principles, 
using as a model the telecommunications system of the USA- an agglomeration of some 1,700 private companies, 
all working as separate "profit centers" to provide an inter-connected network sensitive to the demands of their 
customers. 
Telecommunications - a useful model 
Telecommunications is a useful model because, like the road system, it serves large numbers of 
customers, all of whom have the exclusive use of privately-owned or rented equipment and the opportunity to use 
this equipment by utilizing infrastructure over which they do not have exclusive control. Both roads and 
telecommunications are characterized by congestion which arises at specific times and places. But, unlike the 
modern road sector, telecommunication services in many countries have managed to avoid the extremes of 
congestion and over-investment so typical of roads. This is because telecommunications did - and roads did not 
- develop pricing systems responsive to costs, and investment criteria responsive to consumer demand. 
In most countries telecommunications are operated as government-owned monopolies, while in others 
- notably in the USA- they developed as privately-owned public utilities, subject to government regulation. Both 
models have lessons for the road sector. The relative success of government-owned telephone monopolies shows 
that private ownership is not a necessary condition for efficiency in the roads sector. But the attributes of 
ownership are clearly associated with efficiency. 
PAYING FOR ROADS 
An efficient system of highway charging would require users to pay the costs that they themselves cause. 
But present systems of paying for roads are far from efficient; instead of individuals paying the costs arising out 
of their own use of roads, total costs are divided among groups of road users, with individuals paying through road 
taxes an average of the total costs incurred. In this way, there is only a weak link between those who impose heavy 
costs and those who have to pay the resulting bills. 
Under the present system there are of course .s.Qllli!. differences between payment made by individuals: 
owners of trucks pay more than owners of automobiles, and those who consume large amounts of fuel pay more 
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than those who use little. But these differences are too small to substantially influence the behavior of those who 
impose particularly heavy costs on the highways, especially in the categories of: (a) owners of heavy-axle trucks, 
and (b) users of congested roads. In a market economy these classes of road users would ideally be dealt with as 
follows: 
Vehicles with Heavy Axles 
It is well known that the damage caused by vehicles to highway pavements is a factor of axle weight. The 
American Association of State Highway Officials (AASHO - the predecessor of the present American 
Association of State Highway and Transportation Officials - AASHTO) evaluated the effects of axle loading on 
pavement life in the 1940s and 1950s. While the precise relationship between damage and axle weight varies with 
circumstances, the AASHTO research indicated that damage increases approximately in proportion to the fourth 
power of the axle weight. This "fourth power rule" - where applicable - would mean that doubling of a vehicle's 
axle weight can increase the damage it inflicts on the highway by 2x 2x 2x 2 = 16 times. Thus, an 80,000-lb truck 
with its weight equally distributed over five axles can do as much damage to a highway pavement as about 10,000 
automobiles with two 2,000-lb axle loads: (5/2x 8 x8x 8 x 8 = 10,240). A rational charging system for heavy trucks 
would take account of this, to encourage operators to reduce highway damage by equipping their vehicles with 
more axles. For example, a two-axle vehicle weighing 24-tons would, if each axle carries twelve tons, cause over 
three times as much damage as a similar vehicle equipped with three axles each carrying 8-tons. New Zealand 
does in fact tax its heavy vehicles in a manner that encourages truckers to minimize axle weights, rather than 
vehicle weights. 
In their recent book Road Work: A New Highway Pricing and Investment Policy1, the authors Kenneth 
Small, Clifford Winston and Carol Evans calculated that a policy of taxing heavy vehicles in rough proportion to 
damage caused, coupled with a pavement strengthening program, would produce substantial benefits to the U.S. 
economy (over $7-billion a year in 1982 conditions) without imposing corresponding costs on most truckers, who 
could benefit from reduced fuel taxes and registration fees. Some truckers (for example, those using two-axle 
vehicles) could become worse off, but even their loss could be mitigated by giving them time to replace their 
equipment, or by aiding them financially to do so. These principles are probably applicable in all areas, though 
the precise ratios depend on the physical structure of the road, and on such factots as terrain, weather and geology. 
Vehicles Causing Congestion 
The direct costs imposed by users of congested roads are perceived to be the slowing down of other users. 
The sole user of a freeway can safely travel on it at a high speed, but congested conditions can bring all traffic to 
a stop. This congestion can only occur because the "freeway" is, literally almost "free" to users to crowd on it and 
degrade the quality of its service. In this sense "congestion" can be seen as arising out of the absence of pricing 
which, in a market economy, serves the purpose of reducing demand and increasing supply. The absence of market 
pricing arises, of course, from the absence of property rights in road space. 
If roads were supplied by competitive markets, the appropriate price would be that which generated the 
funds required to operate the system and maximize the profits of the suppliers, who would have to offer service 
levels for which users would be prepared to pay. The level of toll required would have to be found by trial and 
error, but payments in the range of $2 to $5 a day would be likely. Calculations made for the San Francisco Bay 
area suggested that, under the conditions prevailing in 1972, "optimal tolls charged to expressway users ... would 
range from below 1 cent per vehicle-mile for off-peak periods up to rush-hour tolls of 1-7 cents on rural roads, 
2-9 cents on suburban roads, and 6-35 cents on downtown roads" In Singapore a fee approximating US$1.50 -
which in the early days probably moved out too much traffic- has abolished city-center congestion in the morning 
and evening peak periods. It is levied by requiring those who drive automobiles into the central area in the peaks 
to purchase in advance daily or monthly windscreen stickers, which are observed by police at the entrances to the 
restricted zone. 
To be efficient and effective, charges for the use of congested roads should be applied selectively, with 
the prices charged reflecting congestion levels on different road links and at different times of the day, as is done 
in the case of telephone charges. For this reason alone, collecting at conventional toll booths would be impractical. 
It would also be impractical because an efficient charging system should enable charges to be levied without 
vehicles having to stop. Electronic charging systems can perform these tasks, and one, utilizing automatic vehicle 
identification, is already in operation in the U.S. Other electronic systems have been proposed, including a system 
that would work like modern subway tickets, which lose value as they are used up, without being linked to 
particular individuals or automobiles. It is not necessary to describe these systems in this paper. Suffice it to say 
that the collection of payment for road use without toll plazas is today as technically feasible as paying for 
telephone use without coin-operated call-boxes. 
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Dedicated Road Funds 
Even if congestion and axle-load charges were introduced, other revenue sources would still be necessary 
to cover the costs of highway management, e.g. policing, sign-posting and administration. These costs could 
conveniently be covered by a surcharge on fuel. A fuel surcharge might also be a suitable way to cover the costs 
of maintaining roads. The dedication to roads of funds collected from road users does not imply that government 
should never tax road users to enhance general revenues. The point made here is that the funds should not be 
intermingled. This separation is taken for granted in the telephone and electricity services, which are taxed by 
many governments without all user payments going into general revenues. 
Dedicated state or regional highway funds that do not discriminate against privately provided roads 
might provide the best mechanism for funneling payments from road users to road providers - public or private 
- in areas in which congestion and heavy axle loading to not pose significant problems. These funds could be 
allocated -without discrimination against privately provided roads - on the basis of traffic counts or other criteria. 
The idea of paying road providers in proportion to the traffic generated on their roads was discussed in Britain 
in the 1980s3; these payments were dubbed "shadow tolls", as the road providers were to receive funds without 
the traffic have to make additional payments. "Shadow tolls" have recently been rejected by the UK 
Government, for reasons that were not made clear. 
Payments by Property Owners 
In the case of lightly-used roads, such as are to be found in many rural areas, there may not be enough 
traffic to generate the funds required for maintenance. For example, a study comparing highway costs and 
revenues in Arizona in 19834 showed that, while total costs were well-covered by total revenues, the costs of 
maintaining 46 percent of the highway mileage was not covered by the revenues generated on those sections. In 
some cases, payments by property owners, either through voluntary associations or through property taxes, could 
be the best way to keep such roads open. 
Vehicles Causing PoHution 
This paper cannot deal with the problems caused by pollution-emitting vehicles because so little is known 
about the magnitude of the costs involved. But it is clear that pollution charges, equal to the costs caused by 
pollutants, would be a much more efficient solution to this problem than country-wide restrictions. To the extent 
that pollution problems are serious in certain places at certain times, policies should be designed to discourage 
the use of polluting vehicles in those specific areas, rather than to prohibit them everywhere. Professor Donald 
Stedman, at the University of Denver, has developed a device for assessing pollution levels, by measuring the 
carbon monoxide emissions as they pass a sensor. This device can enable road authorities to detect precisely 
which vehicles pollute. It could cost about US$40 per ton of carbon monoxide removed to identify the worst 
polluters and deal with them.' 
INVESTMENT CRITERION 
The application of "average pricing", whereby the total costs of roads are decided politically and then 
, I divided "fairly" among users, logically leads to the result that roads make neither profits nor losses. How then 
are investment decisions made? In the absence of market criteria of profit and loss, investment decisions are made 
by elected officials in the light of advice on highway "needs" received from professional staff. Decisions on where 
to invest highway monies are not taken in response to the needs of roads users as expressed by the willingness to 
pay, but as a result of administrative allocations often governed by political priorities. 
Even when there is no question of impropriety, investment decisions made on the basis of official 
assessments of "needs" cannot adequately reflect the preferences of customers - the road users. If the use of roads 
was charged for on a market basis - i.e. users being required to pay for costs imposed, including congestion costs 
- the investment criterion of profitability could be used as a yardstick for investment decisions. This would have 
two obvious advantages: (a) investments made on this basis could be compared with other revenue-earning ones, 
including especially railways and (b) such investments could be carries out by both the public and private sectors. 
By definition, use of the profitability criterion would result in a self-financing road system, independent of general 
revenues. Self-financing is taken for granted in the electricity, gas and telephone services. 
A Se1f-Financjn~ Road System 
Thus, it is not impossible to envisage road systems based on market principles being operated by the 
public or private sector, as are telephone, electricity and water utilities. These road systems, whether publicly 
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or privately owned, could raise revenues from their customers - the road users - using one or more of the methods 
described above. Like other public utilities, road companies would have to pay for the resources used and, in a 
market economy, these payments should include market rents for the land occupied by the roads. 
Financing congested roads. 
Under conditions of congestion, the price of road use in a market economy would be determined by 
congestion levels, in the same way that office rents are determined by occupancy levels. Additional investment 
to increase highway capacity would reduce congestion and the appropriate congestion charges. If highways were 
supplied by competitive markets, the prices on the different road links would be those that generated the funds 
required to operate the highway system and increase its capacity to the point at which congestion was reduced 
to levels acceptable to users. 
Financing uncongested roads. 
Unlike congested roads, uncongested ones cannot be financed by charging users no more than the costs 
arising directly out of use. Additional funding would be required. Possible sources would be charges on property, 
dedicated road funds (as mentioned above) or, in some circumstances, surpluses earned on neighboring 
congested roads. 
Role of Private Ownership 
The idea that roads can be operated by the public sector in accordance with market rules in not new; 
proposals for self-financing road systems go back to at least to 1966 (5). the problem with this idea is that no 
government anywhere has shown any interest in implementing it. There has been talk of "road pricing" in 
academic circles, and implementation in Singapore and Bergen. But these pricing systems were introduced ad 
hoc, and not as part of a general system of road management. What seems to he lacking in these proposals is 
consideration of the role of private ownership, which is important for two reasons: 
First, in an environment that does not discriminate against the private sector, the private ownership of 
roads would allow investors to provide road facilities in places where there is unsatisfied demand, for example 
in congested urban areas. All of the funding methods mentioned earlier-from "shadow tolls" to axle charges to 
electronic road pricing - could allocate funds on the basis of traffic counts as easily to private providers as to 
government agencies. In this way, road users could get increased mobility even if government priorities directed 
public funds elsewhere. 
Second, there is a real danger that road pricing, when it is introduced, will by used by governments as 
a "cash cow", in the way that fuel taxes in Europe are used today. The ability of private investors to provide 
competitive links in road networks (in the same way that private long-distance telephone companies in the U.S. 
provide competitive telephone services) can give road users some protection against exploitation by government 
road monopolies. 
Private entities wishing to provide public roads face formidable difficulties, but these need not be 
insuperable (6). Rights-of-way are often available over or alongside existing roads or railway lines; financing can 
be obtained from the methods discussed above; and the establishment of payment methods that do not 
discriminate against private suppliers would give some protection against competition from government-
financed "freeways". 
Roles of Government 
Under a market system, the roles of government in the roads sector would be (a) establishing and 
enforcing standards related to safety, and (b) ensuring \bat road users are not exploited by monopolists. 
Governments could also have a role in operating dedicated «road funds" (e.g. allocating payments to road 
providers on the basis of traffic volumes or other agreed criteria), though governments have such a poor record 
in preserving the integrity of road funds (7) that, in some countries, private institutions might be considered more 
trustworthy. It is possible to envisage such funds being lodged in commercial banks under the supervision of 
trustees representing the interests of road users. 
Problems 
It is not suggested that the establishment and operation of self-financing road systems would be problem-
free. Indeed, if there were no problems with it, the subject would not have sufficient interest to merit presentation 
at a professional conference. 
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Some of the more serious problems should be mentioned. 
Dealing with under-utilized roads 
This is the most difficult of all the problems relating to the private provision of roads, as free markets 
cannot operate without profits. This is not necessarily an "equity" issue - many under-utilized roads could be 
those serving the remote estates of the rich. But a change to a market-based system would result in losers as well 
as in gainers, and ways would have to be found to enable the latter to compensate the former. 
Dealing with surpluses from congested roads 
A market-based road system is likely to generate large surpluses in congested areas, and the disposal of 
these surpluses should be based on the relevant economic principles, rather than on ad hoc political expedients 
that could be easily changed. As was mentioned earlier, a substantial part of road pricing revenues would 
probably be payable as rents to the land-owning authorities. Any remaining surpluses should, in a free society, 
belong to those fortunate enough to earn them. The existence of surpluses in road provision is likely to attract 
further investment in roads, on \Vhich some of the profits may be spent. Another likely candidate would be the 
maintenance of neighboring underutilized roads. 
A candidate who should probably get low priority is the subsidization of public transport. !tis the absence 
of road pricing that justifies subsidies to public transport ("If the private car user does not pay the full costs of using 
congested roads, why should the bus-rider be required to do so?"). If road congestion charges were paid by private 
transport, the case for subsidizing public transport would be much weakened. The reduction in traffic congestion 
brought about by road pricing would speed public transport considerably, and its costs should fall accordingly. 
Furthermore, the high fares and unsuitable service faced by public transport users in many western cities is often 
due to regulations that prohibit the private provision of high-frequency minibus services more responsive to users' 
needs. In many countries, public transport could be improved more effectively by deregulation than by 
subsidizing existing public monopolies. 
Should private road providers be free to fix their prices? 
The question of whether government should determine the charges for the use of congested roads has 
intrigued economists since the 1920s, when Frank Knight, in a celebrated article (8), suggested that if roads were 
privately owned the market itself could be relied on determine socially-optimal prices. This assertion has been 
challenged by (among others) James Buchanan (9) and David Mills (10) both of who argue that Knight was right 
only to the extent that roads were provided competitively. One hesitates to follow such heavyweights in this 
discussion, but one principle seems clear: Where private suppliers add links to existing road networks, monopoly 
powers are decreased, so the public welfare is increased even if the new suppliers are allowed to charge at profit-
maximizing rates. I deduce from this that, where a public road is privately provided as a result of voluntary 
transactions -where, for example, no governmental powers are used to purchase land- and where the new owner 
is given no protection from competitors, it is difficult to justify government interference in the rights of the owners 
to set any fees they please. Conversely, where government powers are used to buy land, or where a private 
supplier is given protection from competition, an arrangement to limit the profits of the enterprise seems 
reasonable. 
Conclusion 
The 1,500 or so local and 200 long-distance private companies that comprise the U.S. telecommunication 
system provide a useful model of how a well-managed, competitive, and self- financing road system could operate. 
Given consistent technical standards, and similar pricing and investment principles, self-financing "road utilities" 
could be entirely government-owned, or they could contain both publicly- and privately-owned systems designed 
to standards for which their customers are prepared to pay. 
It is also possible to envisage road networks privately owned and operated, with intervention from 
government being confined to the promotion of safety, the protection of users against monopoly exploitation, and 
(possibly) the collection and allocation of payments from road users. 
Majorproblems with publicly or privately provided "road utilities" would be the financing of uncongested 
roads and the disposal of the profits from congested ones. Some degree of cross-subsidization would probably 
be inevitable. 
The immediate privatization of roads is not suggested, only that the private sector be allowed to provide 
roads, on equal terms with the public sector. 
271 
References 
(1) Kenneth A. Small, Clifford Winston, Carol A. Evans. 
Road Work: A New Highway Pricjng and Investment Policy. 
The Brookings Institute, Washington DC, 1988. 
(2) Theodore E. Keeler and Kenneth A. Small. "Optimal Peak-Load Pricing, Investment, and Service Levels 
on Urban Expressways". Journal of Politjcal Economy, Vol. 85, No. 1, 1977. 
(3) David Howell. "Private Investment in Transport" Introduction to Roads and the Private Sector, (Eamonn 
Butler, Editor), Adam Smith Institute, London, 1982. 
( 4) John Semmens and Gabriel Roth. "The Road to Privatization of Highway Activities". Proceedings of the 
Transportation Research Forum, Vol. XXIV, No. 1, Arlington, Virginia, 1982. 
(5) Gabriel Roth. "A Self-Financing Road System". Research Monograph No. 3, Institute ofEconomicAffairs, 
London, 1966. 
(6) Gabriel Roth. "Perestroika for US Highways: Managing Roads for a Free Society". Reason Foundation, 
Policy Insight No. 125, Santa Monica, California, 1990. 
(7) William McCleary. "The Earmarking of Government Revenue: A Review of Some World Bank Experience". 
The World Bank Research Observer, Vol. 6, No. 1, pp. 81-104, Washington DC, January 1991. 
(8) Frank H. Knight. "Some Fallacies in the Interpretation of Social Cost". Quarterly Journal of Economics, 
Vol. 38, pp. 582-606, August 1924. 
(9) J.M. Buchanan. "Private Ownership and Common Usage: The Road Case Re-examined". Southern 
Economic Journal, Vol. 22, pp. 305-316, January 1956. 
(10) David E. Mills. "Ownership Arrangements and Congestion-Prone Facilities". American Economic 
~.Vol. 71 No. 3, pp. 493-502. June, 1981. 
272 
